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DOES ANYBODY REALLY NEED A
LIMITED PUBLIC FORUM?
NORMAN T. DEUTSCHt
A large portion of the physical property and means of
communications in this country is owned or controlled by the
government.' Consequently, an important constitutional law
issue is the extent to which speakers may use such property to
exercise First Amendment protected speech rights.2 To resolve
this question, the United States Supreme Court uses "a forum
analysis."3 The underlying premise of this framework is that the
right to use government property for speech purposes and the
standard of judicial review that applies for government
exclusions depend on how the property is categorized. 4 The
Court has "identified" three basic categories of forums.5 These
t Professor of Law, Albany Law School, Union University. The author wishes to
thank Brooke Tanner, Class of 2008, for valuable research support.
1 See Ronald A. Cass, First Amendment Access to Government Facilities, 65 VA.
L. REV. 1287, 1287 n.1 (1979) (noting that as of "1974 governments owned... nearly
40% of all land in the United States"); see also infra notes 99-1-3 and accompanying
text (mentioning various government-controlled means of communications).
2 The First Amendment does not protect all speech. See Frederick Schauer, The
Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional
Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1771, 1773 (2004) (pointing out that there are
large categories of "what would be called 'speech' in ordinary language" that are not
encompassed within the First Amendment). If the First Amendment does not protect
the speech at issue, there is no First Amendment right to exercise that speech on
government property. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 797 (1985) ("[We must first decide whether solicitation ... is speech
protected by the First Amendment, for if it is not, we need go no further."); cf. Jones
v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977) ("The fact of
confinement and the needs of the penal institution impose limitations on
constitutional rights, including those derived from the First Amendment."); Se.
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (attempting to deny access to a
public forum based on its alleged constitutionally proscribable obscene content).
3 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
4 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983) ("The
existence of a right of access to public property and the standard by which
limitations upon such a right must be evaluated differ depending on the character of
the property at issue.").
5 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
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are the traditional public forum, the designated public forum,
and the nonpublic forum. 6
The Court has also identified the limited public forum as a
fourth category. 7 Some commentators and individual Justices
have concluded that the Court has drained the limited public
forum of any practical significance.8 Nonetheless, it lives on as a
shell. Its continued existence has caused doubt and confusion
among the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals particularly as to
its relationship to the designated public forum and the nonpublic
forum. 9 The prevailing view in those courts is that it is a subset
6 Id.
7 See Perry, 460 U.S. at 37, 46 n.7 ("A public forum may be created for a limited
purpose such as use by certain groups or for the discussion of certain subjects."
(citations omitted)).
8 See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 825 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("The Court's analysis empties the limited-public-forum concept of
meaning...."); Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History
and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1757 (1987) (opining that
the Court has "shr[u]nk[] the limited public forum to such insignificance that it is
difficult to imagine how a plaintiff could ever successfully prosecute a lawsuit to gain
access to such a forum"); Lee Rudy, Note, A Procedural Approach to Limited Public
Forum Cases, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1255, 1285 (1995) (similar); see also Nathaniel
'Than' Landman, Comment, Constitutional Law: The End of the Limited Public
Forum?, 25 WASBURN L.J. 375, 384 (1986) (arguing that the Court has "eliminate[d]
the concept of the limited public forum").
9 See Gilles v. Blanchard, 477 F.3d 466, 474 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that various
and confusing terms have been used to describe the "fourth category" of forum
including "'the limited designated public forum' (versus the 'true forum'), the
'limited public forum,' or the 'limited forum' "); Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic
Ministries v. Glover, 462 F.3d 1194, 1203 & n.8 (9th Cir. 2006), rev'd in part, vacated
in part, 480 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3022 (U.S. Oct. 1,
2007) ('The contours of the terms 'designated public forum' and 'limited public
forums' have not always been clear."); Child Evangelism Fellowship of Md., Inc. v.
Montgomery County Pub. Schs., 457 F.3d 376, 382 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting that the
Supreme Court "has never squarely addressed the difference between a designated
public forum and a limited public forum"); Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 975 (8th
Cir. 2006) ("[O]ur Circuit's analysis of what constitutes a 'designated public forum,'
like our sister Circuits', is far from lucid. Substantial confusion exists regarding
what distinction, if any exists between a 'designated public forum' and a 'limited
public forum.' "); Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 76 n.4 (1st Cir.
2004) (noting that the First Circuit has used the term limited public forum as a
"synonym" for both a designated public forum and a nonpublic forum, but
"adopt[ing] the usage equating limited public forum with non-public forum");
Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1002 n.4 (10th Cir. 2002) ("A 'limited
public forum' is a subset of the nonpublic forum classification."). See generally
Ronnie J. Fisher, Comment, "What's in a Name?": An Attempt to Resolve the
"Analytic Ambiguity" of the Designated and Limited Public Fora, 107 DICK. L. REV.
639, 643-69 (2003) (collecting and discussing the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals
cases).
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of the former, 10 but there is also authority that it is a subset of
the latter.1 One common way the circuit courts have described
the limited public forum is as "a subcategory of the designated
public forum, where the government opens a nonpublic forum but
reserves access for only certain groups or categories of speech."'12
This Article analyzes the Court's forum structure. It argues
that it is time to bury the limited public forum as a separate and
distinct category because as a practical matter it serves no useful
purpose. Instead, it proposes that the Court analyze speaker
access issues in terms of open and restrictive forums. Such an
approach would make the analysis in forum cases easier, more
direct, and less confusing.
I. THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN FORUM CASES
There are two different standards of review for judging the
constitutionality of government exclusions in forum cases13:
They are reasonableness and strict scrutiny. Under the
reasonableness standard, only exclusions that are content or
viewpoint discriminatory are required to be justified by some
narrowly drawn compelling interest; 4 but exclusions that are
content neutral' 5 and viewpoint neutral are only required to be
reasonable.' 6 By contrast, under strict scrutiny all exclusions are
10 See Glover, 462 F.3d at 1203 n.8; Bowman, 444 F.3d at 976; Make the Rd. by
Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir. 2004); Donovan ex rel. Donovan
v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 F.3d 211, 225 (3d Cir. 2003); Chiu v. Piano
Indep. Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 330, 346 n.12 (5th Cir. 2001).
11 Ridley, 390 F.3d at 76 n.4 (equating limited public forums with nonpublic
forums); Summum, 297 F.3d at 1002 n.4 ("A 'limited public forum' is a subset of the
nonpublic forum classification.").
12 Glover, 462 F.3d at 1203 n.8; see also cases cited supra note 10.
13 A third standard of review applies to regulations that do not absolutely
exclude speech from a forum, but regulate its time, place, and manner. Such rules
must be "content neutral .... narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication." Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
14 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112-13 (2001)
(questioning, but not deciding, whether the Establishment Clause would provide a
compelling reason for viewpoint discrimination); Widmar v. Vincent, :454 U.S. 263,
269-70 (1981) (applying strict scrutiny to a content based exclusion from a limited
public forum).
15 The content neutrality requirement is discussed infra notes 178-220 and
accompanying text.
16 For cases stating the viewpoint neutral and reasonableness requirement in
the context of nonpublic forums, see Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523
U.S. 666, 682 (1998); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
2008]
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required to be narrowly drawn to serve some compelling interest
regardless of whether they are content neutral, viewpoint neutral
and reasonable.' 7 The application of these standards in the
forum cases is discussed below.18
II. THERE ARE ESSENTIALLY Two TYPES OF FORUMS
Although the Court has "identified" four categories of
forums, there are essentially only two. Forums are either
open or restrictive. An open forum is generally available for
all speakers and topics; a restrictive forum is available only for
certain speakers and topics. 19  Forums are created either
by the Court as a matter of constitutional interpretation or by
government designation. 20
III. THE TRADITIONAL PUBLIC FORUM IS A COURT-CREATED
OPEN FORUM
The Court has held as a matter of constitutional
interpretation that public sidewalks, streets and parks are
traditional public forums. 2' Such places are deemed, as a matter
788, 806 (1985); Perry, 460 U.S. at 46, 48-49. For cases stating the principle in the
context of limited public forums, see Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-07;
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). The
reasonableness requirement is discussed below in notes 221-58 and accompanying
text.
17 Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677; Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505
U.S. 672, 678 (1992); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800; Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
18 See infra notes 23-25, 114-17, 127-285 and accompanying text.
19 See generally Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-47 (describing the various types of
forums).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 45; see, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 179-80 (1983)
(sidewalks surrounding the Supreme Court). The public forum doctrine has its origin
in Justice Roberts's well known dictum in Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) (plurality opinion).
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places
has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights,
and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to
use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions
may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and
must exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience,
and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise
of regulation, be abridged or denied.
[Vol. 82:107
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of First Amendment right, to be generally open to all speakers
and topics.22 Government exclusions of speakers or subjects from
traditional public forums based on content 23 or otherwise24 are
subject to strict scrutiny. Such exclusions must be "necessary to
serve a compelling state interest and.. . narrowly drawn to
achieve that interest."25
The rationales for a First Amendment right for speakers to
use traditional public forums-public sidewalks, streets, and
parks-for speech purposes is said to be that such property "has
as a principal purpose promoting 'the free exchange of ideas,'"26
and that such places "have immemorially been held in trust for
the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussing public questions .... from ancient times."2 7 These
rationales seem of doubtful validity.
First of all, the Court has never cited any authority to
support the assertion that streets and parks "have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out
of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions,.., from ancient times."2 Certainly, as late as 1895,
this proposition escaped no less an authority than Justice
Holmes. As a member of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, he held that "[flor the legislature absolutely or
conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public
22 See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
23 See id. (stating that content based exclusions from a traditional public forum
are subject to strict scrutiny).
24 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)
(stating generally that exclusions from a traditional forum are subject to strict
scrutiny); see also Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,
678 (1992) (similar).
25 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800; accord Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes,
523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998) (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800); Lee, 505 U.S. at 678;
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. The government, however, may enforce time, place, and
manner restrictions. See supra note 13.
26 Lee, 505 U.S. at 682 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800).
27 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (plurality opinion).
28 Id.; see, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972); cf.
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 93 (1987)
[hereinafter Content-Neutral Restrictions] (characterizing the "public trust"
rationale as "artificial and fictitious"). There may, however, be "historical
antecedents for the right to petition for grievances." Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39,
51 n.2 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing and discussing authorities).
2008)
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park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the
public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his
house."
29
The Court's other rationale for the public's right to use public
sidewalks, streets, and parks as public forums-that such
property "has as a principal purpose promoting 'the free
exchange of ideas' "3 0 -is, as Justice Kennedy has asserted, "a
most doubtful fiction."31  As he has observed, "[i]t would seem
apparent that the principal purpose of streets and
sidewalks ... is to facilitate transportation, not public discourse,
and ... the purpose for the creation of public parks may be as
much for beauty and open space as for discourse."
32
Perhaps the most sensible rationale for the traditional public
forum doctrine is that "access to public property ... is essential
to effective exercise of first amendment rights."33 As the Court
has articulated it, the underlying purpose of the First
Amendment, is to "'assure unfettered interchange of ideas for
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people.' "34 This "'[flreedom of discussion ... embrace[s] all
issues about which information is needed or appropriate to
enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their
period.' ,35 Consequently, "[t]he guarantees for speech and press
are not the preserve of political expression or comment upon
public affairs," but apply to "matter[s] of public interest"
generally.36
The interchange of ideas implies "communication" to
others,3 7 not simply "wagging one's tongue."38  Thus, the "First
29 Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (Mass. 1895), affd sub. nom. Davis
v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
30 Lee, 505 U.S. at 682 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800).
31 Id. at 696 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
32 Id. at 696-97; see also United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 744 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (similar).
33 GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1306 (Aspen Publishers
5th ed. 2005) (discussing CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (Princeton Univ. Press
2001)).
34 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34-35 (1973) (quoting Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
35 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1966) (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)).
36 Id.
37 Melville B. Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First
Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29, 36 (1973) (noting that "[w]hatever else may or
may not be true of speech, as an irreducible minimum it must constitute
[Vol. 82:107
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Amendment [must] protect[] the right of every citizen to 'reach
the minds of willing listeners and to do so there must be
opportunity to win their attention.' "39 To get their attention,
some means of communication is required. Not everyone has a
printing press, and even in the era of e-mail and instant
messaging, not everyone has a computer or is computer literate.40
Besides, a face-to-face encounter may still be the most effective
means of communicating ideas.41 Furthermore, if the additional
First Amendment rights "of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances" 42 are
to have any practical meaning at all, there must be some right to
assemble somewhere. Consequently, the most logical places for
people to assemble to exchange ideas are sidewalks, streets, and
parks that are generally open and where members of the public
have every right to be,43 regardless of whether or not free
expression is their principal purpose and has been from time
immemorial.
Nonetheless, using one or both the rationales that a
property's principal purpose must be free expression and that it
communication .... [which] in turn, implies both a communicator and a
communicatee-a speaker and an audience").
38 Oliver A. Houck, Things Fall Apart: A Constitutional Analysis of Legislative
Exclusion, 55 EMORY L.J. 1, 22 (2006) (using the term "wagging one's tongue").
39 Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 655
(1981) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949)).
40 See Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 50-51 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("Those who do not control television and radio, those who cannot afford to advertise
in newspapers or circulate elaborate pamphlets may have only a... limited type of
access to public officials."); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 12-24, at 987 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that "streets, sidewalks, and parks" are
"indispensable ... to people who lack access to more elaborate (and more costly)
channels" of communication).
41 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 30-32 (noting that keeping streets and parks
open to speakers "promotes three important goals" because it (1) "ensures that
speakers can have access to a wide array of people," (2) "allows speakers not only to
have general access to heterogeneous people, but also to specific people
and... institutions with whom they have a complaint," and (3) "increases the
likelihood that people generally will be exposed to a wide variety of people and
views").
42 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
43 Cf. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 696 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Public places are of necessity the locus
for discussion of public issues, as well as protest against arbitrary government
action."); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943) ("One who is rightfully on a
street which the state has left open to the public carries with him there as elsewhere
the constitutional right to express his views in an orderly fashion.").
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must have been so used immemorially, the Court has narrowly
defined the traditional forum category. 44 Public property other
than sidewalks, streets, and parks, such as residential
mailboxes45 and utility poles,46 do not qualify; nor do all
sidewalks, streets, and parks. In particular, the Court has also
denied traditional forum status to streets and sidewalks that are
enclosed within other government property.
For example, in Greer v. Spock 47 the Court held that a
military base was not a public forum even though unrestricted
areas of the base had roads and footpaths that were freely open
to the public. 48 In his dissent, Justice Brennan argued that these
unrestricted areas did "not differ in their nature and use from
city streets and lots where open speech long has been
protected."49 The majority, however, focused on the fact that a
military base was involved. It reasoned that "[t]he notion that
federal military reservations, like municipal streets and parks,
have traditionally served as a place for free public assembly and
communication of thoughts by private citizens is ... historically
and constitutionally false."50 The function of a military base is
"to train soldiers, not to provide a public forum" and "[a]
necessary concomitant of the basic function of a military
installation has been the 'historically unquestioned power of (its)
commanding officer summarily to exclude civilians from the area
of his command.' ,1
- Cf. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 741 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (complaining that the "public forum categories-originally conceived of
as a way of preserving First Amendment rights.., have been used... as a means of
upholding restrictions").
45 U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S 114, 128
(1981) (holding that "[t]here is neither historical nor constitutional support for the
characterization of a letterbox as a public forum").
46 Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 814
(1984) (holding that the appellees "fail[ed] to demonstrate the existence of a
traditional right of access respecting such items as utility poles for the purposes of
their communication comparable to that recognized for public streets and parks").
47 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
48 Id. at 830. Despite the apparent public access, "[m]ilitary police regularly
patrol[led] the roads within the reservation, and they occasionally stop[ped] civilians
and ask[ed] them the reason for their presence." Id.
49 Id. at 861 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
50 Id. at 838 (majority opinion).
51 Id. (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElory, 367 U.S. 886, 893 (1961)). The
Court distinguished Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197 (1972), in which the Court
reversed the conviction of a civilian who was arrested for distributing leaflets on a
street within the limits of a military base. Greer, 424 U.S. at 835-37. The Court said
[Vol. 82:107
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Similarly, in International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,52 the Court, in a five to four decision
on this point, held that an airport terminal was not a traditional
public forum. Justice Kennedy, writing for the dissenters,
argued that parts of the terminal's corridors that were freely
open to the public were public forums. He reasoned that they
were analogous to public streets in that they were "broad, public
thoroughfares full of people and lined with stores and other
commercial activities" and that "while most people who come
to... airports do so for a reason related to air travel, ... this
does not distinguish an airport from streets or sidewalks, which
most people use for travel."53 The majority, however, focused on
the fact that an airport was at issue. They reasoned that airports
are not traditional public forums because they have not
"'immemorially ... time out of mind' been held in public trust
and used for purposes of expressive activity,"54 and they do not
have "as a principal purpose promoting 'the free exchange of
ideas.' 55
In addition, the Court in a five to four decision in Adderley v.
Florida56 held that there was no constitutional right to exercise
speech and assembly rights on a driveway and grassy areas on
government property that housed a jail.57 The Court said that
"[t]he State, no less than a private owner of property, has power
to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it
is lawfully dedicated."58
In United States v. Kokinda,59 however, the Court was
equally divided four to four on whether a sidewalk leading from a
parking lot to the front door of a post office was a traditional
that Flower was different because the street at issue "was a public thoroughfare in
San Antonio no different from all other public thoroughfares in that city, and that
the military had not only abandoned any right to exclude civilian vehicular and
pedestrian traffic from the avenue, but also any right to exclude leaflete(e)rs." Id. at
835.
52 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
53 Id. at 700 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
54 Id. at 680 (majority opinion) (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515
(1939)).
55 Id. at 682 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 800 (1985)).
56 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
57 Id. at 45-48.
58 Id. at 47.
59 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
20081
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public forum.60 Both the sidewalk and the parking lot were
entirely on post office property and were used only for post office
business. 61 The property was located along a major highway and
was separated from it by a public sidewalk that ran parallel to
the road.62 The speakers argued that "although the sidewalk
[was] on Postal Service property, because it is not distinguishable
from the municipal sidewalk across the parking lot from the post
office's entrance, it must be a traditional public forum."63 Justice
Brennan agreed. In his dissent he took the position that
sidewalks are sidewalks 64 and the fact "that the walkway at issue
[was] a sidewalk open and accessible to the general public [was]
alone sufficient to identify it as a [traditional] public forum."65
Justice O'Connor disagreed. In her plurality opinion, she
maintained that neither the "mere physical characteristics of the
property"66 nor the fact that it is "open to the public" determine
whether it is a traditional public forum. 67 Instead, the "critical"
question was its "location and purpose."68 The postal sidewalk
was in fact not a traditional forum because it did not "have
the characteristics of public sidewalks traditionally open to
expressive activity."69  Such sidewalks are "constructed ... to
facilitate the daily commerce and life of the neighborhood or
city"70 and are "'continually open, often uncongested, and
constitute not only a necessary conduit in the daily affairs of a
locality's citizens, but also a place where people ... [could] enjoy
the open air or the company of friends and neighbors in a relaxed
environment.' "71 By contrast, the sidewalk at issue "was
constructed solely to assist the postal patrons to negotiate the
space between the parking lot and the front door of the post
60 Justice Kennedy provided the fifth vote to uphold the government regulation
at issue on the ground that it was not necessary to decide whether the sidewalk was
a public forum because even if it was, the regulation was a reasonable time, place,
and manner regulation. Id. at 737-39 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
61 Id. at 723 (plurality opinion).
62 Id.
63 Id. at 727.
64 See generally id. at 740-49 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 745.
66 Id. at 727 (plurality opinion).
67 Id. at 729.
68 Id. at 728-29.
69 Id. at 727.
70 Id. at 728.
71 Id. at 727 (quoting Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness Inc., 452
U.S. 640, 651 (1981)).
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office, not to facilitate the daily commerce and life of the
neighborhood or city. 72
On the other hand, sidewalks, streets, and parks that
otherwise qualify as traditional public forums do not lose their
status merely because they go through residential
neighborhoods 73 or surround public74 or private property.75 For
example, in United States v. Grace76 the Court held that the
sidewalks surrounding the Supreme Court are traditional public
forums. 77 It reasoned that those sidewalks are
indistinguishable from any other sidewalks in Washington,
D.C ..... [as] [t]here is no separation, no fence, and no
indication whatever to persons stepping from the street to the
curb and sidewalks that serve as the perimeter of the Court
grounds that they have entered some special type of enclave. 78
IV. THE GOVERNMENT MAY CREATE FORUMS FOR SPEECH
Unless the property qualifies as a traditional public forum,
there is no constitutional right of access to government property
for speech purposes absent government permission. 79  If it
chooses, however, the government may create a forum for speech
that otherwise would not exist, but it has no obligation to do so. 80
A majority of the Court has consistently held that "[t]he First
72 Id. at 728. Justice Brennan responded that it was "irrelevant that the
sidewalk... [was] constructed only to provide access to the [post office]" and that it
"[ran] only between the parking lot and the post office entrance." Id. at 744
(Brennan, J., dissenting). He noted that "[plublic sidewalks, parks, and streets have
been reserved for public use as forums for speech even though government has not
constructed them for expressive purposes" and that the "[e]xistence of a public forum
does not turn on a particularized factual inquiry into whether a sidewalk serves one
building or many or whether a street is a dead end or a major thoroughfare." Id.
73 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988) (holding that "[n]o particularized
inquiry into the precise nature a specific street is necessary; all public streets are
held in the public trust and are properly considered traditional public fora").
74 United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (sidewalks surrounding the
Supreme Court).
75 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (sidewalks in front of entrances to
abortion clinics).
76 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
77 Id. at 180.
78 Id. at 179-80.
79 See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966) (no constitutional right protest
on jail property); see also Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S.
672, 679-80 (1992) (summarizing public forum rules).
80 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 803-04
(1985).
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Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply
because it is owned or controlled by government"81 and "the mere
fact that government property can be used as a vehicle for
communication does not mean that the Constitution requires
such uses to be permitted."8 2
The rationale for limiting speaker access to government
property to traditional public forums and to forums that the
government voluntarily creates is said to be that "[t]he United
States Constitution does not forbid a State to control the use of
its own property for its own lawful nondiscriminatory purpose."
8 3
Thus, "[t]he State, no less than a private owner of property, has
power to preserve the property under its control for the use to
which it is lawfully dedicated."8 4
No one on the Court has really disputed the fact that the
Government needs to control its own property.8 5 Governments
must be able to exercise their constitutional and statutory
powers without interference from members of the public who
wish to protest or otherwise use government property for speech
purposes. Several Justices, however, have argued for a more
"flexible approach."8 6  They have complained that the Court's
public forum doctrine "leaves the government with almost
unlimited authority to restrict speech on its property by doing
nothing more than articulating a nonspeech-related purpose for
the area, and it leaves almost no scope for the development
of new public forums absent the rare approval of the
government."87 In addition,
to place such discretion in any public official, be he the
'custodian' of the public property or the local police
81 U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129
(1981).
82 Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 814
(1984).
83 Adderley, 385 U.S. at 48.
84 Id. at 47.
85 Some of the most prominent First Amendment scholars have also agreed that
government needs "flexibility" in controlling its own property. See Cass, supra note
1, at 1316 n.160 ("Professors Chafee, Emerson, and Meiklejohn... share the belief
that government should make some public property available for speech uses but
also agree that government should retain considerable flexibility in fulfilling this
obligation.").
86 Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 860 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
87 Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 695 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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commissioner, is to place those who assert their First
Amendment right at his mercy. It gives him the awesome
power to decide whose ideas may be expressed and who shall be
denied a place to air their claims and petition their
government. 88
Consequently, over time, ten Justices have urged that the
right to use public property for expressive purposes should turn
on whether the speech is compatible with the normal functions of
property.8 9 No five of these Justices, however, sat on the Court
at the same time. As a result, the Court continues to apply rigid
rules rather than a more functional approach. It has been
argued that such a result might be justified on the grounds that
the existing rules "provide ample opportunity for free expression"
and "pose[] no real threat to the market place of ideas."90
Moreover, expanding the scope of access to public property would
only "make some speech marginally more effective .... [blut to
require such access would necessarily interfere with competing
government interests and involve the courts in an endless series
of highly subjective and unpredictable judgments."91
Since the government-created forum is dependent on
government discretion, it is inherently a narrow category.
Nonetheless the Court has expanded its scope in one important
respect. Speakers often do not seek access to tangible physical
property. Instead, they seek access to some government-
controlled "channel of communication." 92  Consequently, the
Court has held that in defining the scope of government-created
forums, it would focus on the precise "access sought by the
speaker."93  Thus, such forums are not limited to particular
places, 94 whether "spatial or geographic," 95 such as a plaza
88 Adderley, 385 U.S. at 54 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
89 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 694-703 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment, joined
on this point by Blackmun, J., Stevens, J., and Souter, J.); Greer, 424 U.S. at 843
(Powell, J., concurring); id. at 860 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting);
Adderley, 385 U.S. at 54-55 (Douglas, J., joined by Warren, C.J., Brennan, J., and
Fortas, J., dissenting).
90 STONE, supra note 33, at 1322.
91 Id.
92 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985).
93 Id.
94 See id. at 800-02 (discussing the fact that forums are not limited to "tangible
government property").
95 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995).
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surrounding a statehouse, 9,6 a municipal auditorium,97 and
university meeting facilities.98  Instead, any government-
controlled means of communication can qualify.99 As a result,
such things as a charity drive, 100 a candidate debate, 101 an
internal mail system, 102 and even the expenditure of money to
support private speech 103 potentially can be government-created
forums. This is consistent with the underlying purpose of the
First Amendment, which is to assure the free exchange of
ideas.104
Under the Court's lexicon, property that the government
voluntarily opens to speakers is categorized as either a
designated public forum, a limited public forum, or a nonpublic
forum. One of the principle areas of confusion in the current law
is the relationship between these three types of forums.
V. GOVERNMENT-CREATED OPEN ACCESS FORUM
If the government chooses it may create a forum that
is generally open for all topics and speakers. The Court
has characterized such an open access forum as a
designated forum of "unlimited character"'0 5 that "may be
created by government designation of a place or channel of
communication for use by the public at large for assembly and
speech."106
Under the Court's construct, whether the Government in fact
has created a designated public forum that is generally available
for speech depends on intent: "The government does not create a
public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but
only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public
96 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
97 Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
98 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1981).
99 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800-02.
100 Id. (holding that on the facts, the Government had not created a public
forum).
101 Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (holding that
on the facts the Government had not created a public forum).
102 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983)
(holding that on the facts the Government had not created a public forum).
103 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-30 (1995)
(holding that the university had created a limited public forum).
104 See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
105 Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992).
106 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
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discourse." 10 7 In determining the government's intent, "the Court
has looked to the policy and practice of the government."10 8 It
"has also examined the nature of the property and its
compatibility with expressive activity."10 9  "[T]he location of
property also has bearing because separation from acknowledged
public areas may serve to indicate that the separated property is
a special enclave, subject to greater restriction."'110 Consequently,
the Court "will not find that a public forum has been created in
the face of clear evidence of a contrary intent, nor will [it] infer
that the government intended to create a public forum when the
nature of the property is inconsistent with expressive activity."11 '
Furthermore, the government does not create a public forum
merely because " 'members of the public are permitted freely to
visit a place owned or operated by the Government.' "112 In
addition, even if the government has created a designated forum,
it "is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the
facility." 1 3
To the extent that the government has created a designated
public forum that is generally available for all speakers and
topics, it is "the functional equivalent of a traditional public
forum."'114 Consequently, the same access rules apply to both
15
even though the government "was not required to create the
forum in the first place."11 6 Strict scrutiny applies and "speakers
cannot be excluded without a compelling governmental
interest."11 7
Because designated public forums and traditional public
forums are functionally equivalent, the Court has sometimes not
distinguished between them. For example in Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., Justice
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Lee, 505 U.S. at 680.
111 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803 (citations omitted).
112 Lee, 505 U.S. at 680 (quoting Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976)).
113 See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
114 G. Sidney Buchanan, The Case of the Vanishing Public Forum, 1991 U. ILL.
L. REV. 949, 958 (1991).
115 Lee, 505 U.S. at 678.
116 See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
117 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985);
see also Perry, 460 U.S. at 45; Lee, 505 U.S. at 678. Of course, the government may
impose time, place, and manner restrictions. See supra note 13.
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O'Connor, writing for a 4-3 majority, used the term "[t]raditional
public fora" to describe "places which 'by long tradition or by
government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate.' "118
Similarly, in Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v.
Pinette,119 a ten-acre state-owned plaza surrounding a statehouse
had been opened to the public for speech purposes for more than
a century.120 In addition, a state statute made "the square
available 'for use by the public ... for free discussion of public
questions, or for activities of a broad public purpose.'"121 Was
the plaza a traditional public forum, a designated public forum,
or both? The lower courts held that it was a traditional public
forum. The Court did not decide the question presumably
because it was unnecessary to do so; either way the exclusion at
issue was subject to strict scrutiny.122
VI. GOVERNMENT-CREATED RESTRICTED ACCESS FORUMS
If the government chooses it may not only create a forum
that is generally open for all subjects and speakers, but it may
also create a forum that is restricted to certain speakers and
subjects. Under the Court's construct, such forums are
characterized as either limited public forums or nonpublic
forums. 123 Thus, "a speaker may be excluded from a nonpublic
forum if he wishes to address a topic not encompassed within the
purpose of the forum or he is not a member of the class of
speakers for whose especial benefit the forum was
I1s Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (emphasis added) (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 45).
It appears that Justice O'Conner misquoted Perry. In Perry, Justice White, writing
for the majority, did not say that "[tiraditional public fora are those places which 'by
long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate.'"
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. What he did say was that "[iln places which by long
tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate, the
rights of the state to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed." Perry, 460
U.S. at 45.
119 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
120 Id. at 757.
121 Id. (quoting OHIO ADMIN. CODE 128:4-02(A) (1994)).
122 See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text. On the facts of Pinette, the
plaza was probably a designated public forum rather than a traditional public
forum. While a century is a long time, it is doubtful that a plaza surrounding a
statehouse could meet the test of being a place that immemorially, time out of mind,
since ancient times, has had as a principal purpose the free exchange of ideas.
123 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001) (limited
public forum); Perry, 460 U.S. at 49 (1983) (nonpublic forum).
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created ... .,"124 Similarly, "[w]hen the State establishes a
limited public forum, the State is not required to and does not
allow persons to engage in every type of speech."125 Instead, it
"may be justified in 'reserving [its forum] for certain groups or for
the discussion of certain topics.' ",126
A. Nonpublic Forum Cases and the Articulated Distinction
Between the Two Types of Restricted Forums
In a series of nonpublic forum cases, the Court has treated
limited public forums and nonpublic forums as separate and
distinct categories. It has characterized the limited public forum
as a type of designated public forum in the sense that it is
government property that the government has intentionally
designated as available for limited speech purposes. 127 It has
used the term nonpublic forum to describe government property
that does not qualify as a public forum, traditional or designated,
even though the government has permitted access to some
speakers and excluded others.1 28  The articulated technical
difference between the two categories is that in nonpublic forums
inclusions and exclusions are made on a "selective," case-by-case
basis, whereas in limited public forums government property is
made "generally" available for certain speakers and topics.1 29
The reason for making the distinction is said to be that
124 Cornelius v. NAACP Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)
(citations omitted); see also Perry, 460 U.S. at 49 (stating that in a nonpublic forum,
the government may "make distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter and
speaker identity").
125 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106.
126 Id. (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
829 (1995)).
127 See, e.g., Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678,
680 (1992) (describing designated public fora as being "of a limited or unlimited in
character-property that the State has opened for expressive activity by part or all
of the public" and noting that "[tihe decision to create a public forum must ... be
made 'by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse'"
(quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802)). At the margins it is sometimes not clear
whether the government has designated public property for open access or limited
access. See infra note 211 and accompanying text (discussing Se. Promotions, Ltd. v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975)).
128 See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 676-78 (1998)
(candidate debate); Lee, 505 U.S. at 678-80 (airport terminal); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at
802-06 (charity drive); Perry, 474 U.S. at 46, 49 (school mail system).
129 Forbes, 523 U.S. at 679-80.
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exclusions from the former are subject to a stricter standard of
review than exclusions from the latter. 130
For example, in Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, a school district, pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement, granted the union that represented the
district's teachers access to its interschool mail system but
denied such access to a rival union. 31 The latter argued that the
mail system had become a limited public forum because it
previously had had equal access to it, and because the district
had permitted its "periodic use by private non-school connected
groups."'13 2 Justice White, writing for the majority, rejected these
arguments and took pains to establish that the mail system was
a nonpublic forum.' 33
Justice White held that the mail system was not a limited
public forum. He viewed such forums as a type of designated
public forum that "the state has opened for use by the public as a
place for expressive activity."13 4 The excluded union's prior equal
access did not create "a limited public forum generally open for
use by employee organizations;" instead, it "simply reflected" that
at the time "both unions represented the teachers and had
legitimate reasons for use of the system."'1 5 The fact that the
district had permitted groups such as "the YMCA, Cub Scouts,
and other civic and church organizations to use the facilities" also
did not create a limited public forum because "there [was] no
indication in the record that the school mailboxes and interschool
system [were] open[ed] for use by the general public."13 6 Instead,
"[p]ermission to use the system to communicate with teachers
[had to] be secured from the individual building principal" and
"[tlhis type of selective access does not transform government
130 Id. at 677, 682; Cornelius, 474 U.S. at 800; Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
131 460 U.S. at 39-41.
132 Id. at 47.
133 Id. at 47-49.
134 Id. at 45. In apparent contradiction, Justice White at one point of his opinion
defined a limited public forum as a "public forum ... limited ... [to] certain
groups ... or for the discussion of certain subjects," id. at 46 n.7, but at another
point he asserted that such "distinctions may be impermissible in a public forum,"
id. at 49. Presumably, what he meant to say was that such distinctions are
impermissible in a designated public forum that is generally open to all speakers
and topics.
135 Id. at 48.
136 Id. at 47.
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property into a public forum." 137  Furthermore, Justice White
supposed that even if access by such groups created a limited
public forum, the union would be outside its scope.138 Any such
forum would be "generally open for use" only by "other entities of
similar character ... that engage in activities of interest and
educational relevance to students."1 39  It "would not as a
consequence be open to an organization ... [that] is concerned
with the terms and conditions of teacher employment."
140
Since the mail system was a nonpublic forum, not a limited
public forum, Justice White held that the exclusion was not
subject to strict scrutiny.1 41 Instead, it only had to be viewpoint
neutral and reasonable.1 42 In applying that standard, he engaged
in an analysis of the underlying facts and concluded that the
differential access accorded the two unions was viewpoint neutral
because it was based on their "status"-the included union
represented the teachers, the excluded union did not-not on any
different points of view they may have had on labor or other
issues. 143 Similarly, he reasoned that the "differential access"
policy was reasonable because it "enable[d]" the included union,
as representative of all the teachers, to carry out its duties as the
exclusive bargaining agent. 144 By contrast, the rival union did
"not have any official responsibility in connection with the school
district and need not be entitled to the same rights of access to
school mailboxes." 145 The exclusion was also reasonable because
it "'serve[d] to prevent the District's schools from becoming a
battlefield for inter-union squabbles,' ",146 and because
"substantial alternative channels ... remained open" for the rival
union to communicate with the teachers.
47
Similarly, in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense &
Educational Fund, Inc., the federal government permitted "an
137 Id.
138 Id. at 48.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 46.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 49-50.
144 Id. at 50-51.
145 Id. at 51.
146 Id. at 52 (quoting Haukvedahl v. Sch. Dist. No. 108, No. 75C-3641 (N.D. Ill.
1976)).
147 Id. at 53.
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annual charitable fund-raising drive ... in the federal workplace
during working hours."148 An executive order:
limited participation to "voluntary, charitable, health and
welfare agencies that provide or support direct health and
welfare services to individuals or their families," and specifically
excluded those "[a]gencies that seek to influence the outcomes of
elections or the determination of public policy through political
activity or advocacy, lobbying, or litigation on behalf of parties
other than themselves."' 149
Plaintiffs, who were excluded because of their efforts to
"influence public policy," brought suit arguing that their
exclusion was unlawful because the charity drive was a "limited
public forum for use by all charitable organizations to solicit
funds from federal employees."1 50 In a four to three decision, the
Court rejected the argument. 151
As did Justice White in Perry, Justice O'Connor, writing for
the majority in Cornelius, considered limited public forums to be
a subset of public forums 152 that are "created by government
designation of a place or channel of communication for use by the
public at large for assembly and speech, for use by certain
speakers, or for the discussion of certain subjects."15 3  She
asserted that in such forums "speakers cannot be excluded
without a compelling government interest," but that "[a]ccess to a
nonpublic forum ... can be restricted as long as the restrictions
are 'reasonable and [are] not an effort to suppress expression
merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view.' "154
Justice O'Connor concluded that the charity drive was a
nonpublic forum and that the exclusion of advocacy groups was
reasonable. She asserted that "government does not create a
public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but
only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public
discourse." 155  To determine intent she looked to the
government's "policy and practice" and "examined the nature of
148 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 474 U.S. 788, 790 (1985).
149 Id. at 795 (quoting Exec. Order No. 12,404, 48 Fed. Reg. 6685 (Feb. 10,
1983)).
150 Id. at 804.
151 Id. at 802-06. Two Justices did not participate in the decision. Id. at 813.
152 See id. at 802-03 (using limited forum cases as examples of "public forums").
153 Id. at 802.
154 Id. at 800.
155 Id. at 802.
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the property and its compatibility with expressive activity."156 In
this case, "[t]he Government's consistent policy [had] been to
limit participation in the CFC to 'appropriate' voluntary agencies
and to require agencies seeking admission to obtain permission
from federal and local Campaign officials." 157 She asserted that
"[s]uch selective access, unsupported by evidence of a purposeful
designation for public use, does not create a public forum." 158
The charity drive was "not create[d] ... for purposes of providing
a forum for expressive activity;" rather, it was "designed to
minimize the disruption to the workplace that had resulted from
unlimited ad hoc solicitation activities by lessening the
amount of expressive activity occurring on federal property." 159
Furthermore, the fact that "[tihe federal workplace, like any
place of employment, exists to accomplish the business of the
employer" supported the conclusion that the charity drive was a
nonpublic forum, not a limited public forum.' 60
Having found the charity drive to be a nonpublic forum,
Justice O'Conner proceeded to determine whether the exclusion
of advocacy groups was reasonable "in light of the purpose of the
forum and all of the surrounding circumstances."'1 61  She
reasoned that given the nature of the property the exclusion was
reasonable because it was designed "to minimize disruption to
the federal workplace, to ensure the success of the fundraising
effort, [and] to avoid the appearance of political favoritism."'1 62
Building on Perry and Cornelius, the Court in Arkansas
Educational Television Commission v. Forbes 63 also treated the
limited public forum as a type of designated public forum 164 that
was separate and distinct from the nonpublic forum, and
asserted that exclusions from the former were subject to strict
scrutiny, 165 while exclusions from the latter were only required to
156 Id.
157 Id. at 804.
158 Id. at 805.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 805-06.
161 Id. at 809.
162 Id. at 813. The Court "decline[d]" to decide whether the exclusion was
viewpoint discriminatory because the issue "was neither decided below or fully
briefed before [the] Court." Id. at 812-13.
163 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
164 See id. at 678-79 (using Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), a limited
public forum case, as an example of a designated public forum).
165 Id. at 677 ("[i]f the government excludes a speaker who falls within the class
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be viewpoint neutral and reasonable. 166 In the case, a public
television station invited the Democratic and Republican
candidates for a congressional seat to participate in a debate, but
excluded a third party candidate. 167 Justice Kennedy, writing for
the majority, held that the debate was a nonpublic forum, not a
"designated public forum," and that the exclusion was viewpoint
neutral and reasonable.
Justice Kennedy based his conclusion that the debate was a
nonpublic forum on "the distinction between 'general access,'
which indicates the property is a designated public forum, and
'selective access,' which indicates the property is a nonpublic
forum."'168 He held that "the government does not create a
designated public forum when it does no more than reserve
eligibility for access to the forum to a particular class of speakers,
whose members must, as individuals, 'obtain permission' to use
it."169 Thus, the debate was a nonpublic forum, not a designated
public forum, because the government did not intend to create
the latter. 170  The debate was not generally available to all
candidates for the congressional seat as it "did not have an open
microphone-format." 171  Instead, the government engaged
in selective access, by making "candidate-by-candidate
determinations as [to] which of the eligible candidates would
participate."172
to which a designated public forum is made generally available, its action is subject
to strict scrutiny").
166 Id. at 682.
167 Id. at 670-71.
168 Id. at 679 (citations omitted).
169 Id. (citations omitted).
170 Id. at 677 (" 'The government does not create a [designated] public forum by
inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a
nontraditional public forum for public discourse.'" (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985))).
171 Id. at 680.
172 Id. Justice Kennedy argued that the "distinction between general and
selective access further[ed] First Amendment interests." Id. at 680. It "encourage[s]
the government to open its property to some expressive activity in cases where, if
faced with an all-or-nothing choice, it might not open its property at all." Id. "Were it
faced with the prospect of cacophony, on the one hand, and First Amendment
liability on the other, a public television broadcaster might choose not to air
candidates' views at all." Id. at 681. This would "'diminish the free flow of
information and ideas'" and would "'inescapably dampena the vigor and limit[] the
variety of public debate.'" Id. (quoting Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,
656 (1994); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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Even though the debate was a nonpublic forum, not a limited
public forum, Justice Kennedy emphasized that nonpublic status
alone did not give the government "unfettered power to exclude
any candidate it wished."173 He then proceeded to analyze the
underlying facts to determine whether the exclusion was
viewpoint neutral and reasonable. He concluded that it was
because it was "beyond dispute that [the third party candidate]
was excluded not because of his viewpoint but because he had
generated no appreciable public interest"174 He also noted that
since there are usually a number of "candidates" who "qualify for
the ballot," "[o]n logistical grounds alone, a public television
editor might, with reason, decide that the inclusion of all ballot-
qualified candidates would 'actually undermine the education
value and quality of debates.' "175
B. The Standard of Review in Restricted Forum Cases
Despite the dicta in the nonpublic forum cases that a
different and stricter standard of review applies for exclusions
from limited public forums than from nonpublic forums, the fact
is that in practice the Court has applied the same standard of
review in both cases. 176 That standard is that content and
viewpoint neutral exclusions must be reasonable and content or
viewpoint discriminatory exclusions are subject to strict
scrutiny. 177
1. The Content and Viewpoint Neutrality Requirements
There is no question that absent some compelling interest,178
exclusions from both nonpublic forums and limited public forums
must be viewpoint neutral in the sense that the government may
not discriminate based on the point of view a speaker may have
173 Id. at 682.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 681 (quoting TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON
PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, LET AMERICA DECIDE 148 (1995)).
176 See supra notes 127-75 and accompanying text (discussing the nonpublic
forum cases); infra notes 259-84 and accompanying text (discussing the limited
public forum cases).
177 See supra notes 127-75 and accompanying text (discussing the nonpublic
forum cases); infra notes 259-84 and accompanying text (discussing the limited
public forum cases).
178 Cf. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112-13 (2001)
(questioning, but not deciding, whether the Establishment Clause would provide a
compelling reason for viewpoint discrimination).
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on a particular subject. 179 The content neutral requirement is
more problematic. The nonpublic cases do not explicitly require
that exclusions also be content neutral, and there is conflicting
authority on the issue in limited public forum cases.
The Court has held that, absent a compelling interest,
exclusions from a limited public forum must be content neutral.
In Widmar v. Vincent, a university created a limited public forum
when it made its meeting "facilities generally available to
registered student groups."18 0  In setting the boundaries of the
forum, however, it excluded student groups that desired to use
the facilities for "'purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching.' ,,s The Court found that the exclusion was based on
the religious content of the speech and applied strict scrutiny.
18 2
In addition, in Perry, the Court stated in dictum that in a public
forum created for limited purposes, "a content-based prohibition
must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state
interest."18 3
Nonetheless, in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
University of Virginia,18 4 the Court did not carefully distinguish
between subject matter discrimination and content
discrimination.18 5 In that case the Court assumed that the
university had created a limited public forum18 6 by providing
funding for certain student groups, including funds to cover the
179 Forbes, 523 U.S. at 682 (stating the rule in the context of a nonpublic forum
and fmding no viewpoint discrimination); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46, 48-49 (1983) (same); see Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806, 812-13 (1985) (stating the rule in
the context of a nonpublic forum but not deciding the issue); see also Good News
Club, 533 U.S. at 106-07 (stating the rule in the context of a limited public forum
and finding viewpoint discrimination); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-37 (1995) (same).
1so Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 264-65 (1981).
181 Id. at 265 n.3 (quoting the "pertinent" university regulation).
182 Id. at 269-70 (stating that such "content based exclusions.., must serve a
compelling interest and ... [be] narrowly drawn to achieve that end").
183 Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 & n.7.
184 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
185 For an article discussing the Court's attempts to distinguish between content
and subject matter discrimination and suggesting possible solutions, see Geoffrey R.
Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-
Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81 (1978-1979). See also Geoffrey R. Stone,
Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 239-42
(1983) (similar).
186 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
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cost of printing student-run publications. 8 7  The funding
guidelines, however, prohibited funding for "'religious
activit[ies],'. . . defined as any activity that 'primarily promotes
or manifests a particular belie[f] in or about an ultimate
reality."'8 Under these guidelines the university denied
funding to a student run publication that was "established '[t]o
publish a magazine of philosophical and religious expression,' 'to
facilitate discussion which fosters an atmosphere of sensitivity to
and tolerance of Christian viewpoints,' and '[t]o provide a
unifying focus for Christians of multicultural backgrounds.' "189
The university specifically argued that the exclusion was
based on the religious content of the speech. 90 In response,
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, noted that while the
government may limit access to a limited public forum to certain
speakers and topics,' 9 ' "[i]t is axiomatic that the government may
not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the
message it conveys."1 92 Nonetheless, he went on to assert that
in determining whether the State is acting to preserve the
limits of the forum it has created so that the exclusion of a class
of speech is legitimate, we have observed a distinction between,
on the one hand, content discriminaticn, which may be
permissible if it preserves the purpose of that limited forum,
and, on the other hand, viewpoint discrimination, which is
presumed impermissible when directed against speech
otherwise within the forum's limitations. 193
Justice Kennedy avoided confronting the full implications of
his assertion that content discrimination might be permissible by
finding that the exclusion was viewpoint discriminatory. 194
Justice Souter, writing for the four dissenters, also seemed to
ignore any distinction between content discrimination and
187 Id. at 824.
188 Id. at 825 (quoting the funding guidelines).
189 Id. at 825-26.
190 Id. at 830-33.
191 Id. at 829.
192 Id. at 828.
193 Id. at 829-30.
194 Id. at 830-31. Justice Kennedy reasoned that "[b]y very terms of
the... prohibition, the University does not exclude religion as a subject matter but
selects for disfavored treatment those student journalistic efforts with religious
editorial viewpoints." Id. at 831. As he saw it, "[tihe prohibited perspective, not the
general subject matter, resulted in the refusal to make third-party payments, for the
subjects discussed were otherwise within the approved category of publications." Id.
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subject matter discrimination. Unlike Justice Kennedy, Justice
Souter thought that the university had engaged in permissible
subject matter discrimination, 195 not impermissible viewpoint
discrimination. 196 As he saw it, the university's Guidelines
"simply den[ied] funding for hortatory speech that 'primarily
promotes or manifests' any view on-the merits of religion; they
den[ied] funding for the entire subject matter of religious
apologetics." 197 Even if Justice Souter were correct that the case
involved subject matter, rather than viewpoint, discrimination,
the University had asserted that it had denied funding because of
the religious content of the speech. 198 Justice Souter recognized
that the Court had "struck down ... attempt[s] to regulate the
content of speech in" a limited public forum. 199 However, he
apparently saw no constitutional infirmity with the government
engaging in content discrimination when defining the scope of
the subject matter permitted in such a forum.
Notwithstanding Rosenberger, there should be no doubt that
in defining the scope of the speakers and subjects permitted in
limited and nonpublic forums, the government, absent some
compelling interest, may not engage in content discrimination.
Clearly, in preserving such forums for their intended purposes,
the government may exclude certain subjects. The whole point of
limited and nonpublic forums is that the government has the
discretion to define the scope of the forums that it creates.
Consequently, a school board may create a limited public forum
that confines its school board meetings to school board
business. 200  The military and a public transit system
respectively may create nonpublic forums that exclude political
speech on a military base201 and on public transportation.
20 2 Of
course, any such exclusion has the incidental effect of
"discriminating" against the content, including viewpoint, of the
195 See id. at 893 n. 12 (Souter, J., dissenting) (asserting that if "determinations
are made on the basis of a reasonable subject-matter distinction, but not on a
viewpoint distinction, there is no violation [of the Free Speech Clause]").
196 Id. at 895.
197 Id. at 896.
198 Id. at 831-33 (majority opinion).
199 Id. at 888 (Souter, J., dissenting).
200 Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wisc. Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S.
167 (1976).
201 Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
202 Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
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excluded speaker's message. The point, however, is that in
defining the scope of restricted forums, the government may not
exclude speakers and subjects "'because of [agreement or]
disagreement with the message'" that the excluded speaker
seeks to "'convey[].' "203 In other words, there must some
203 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (quoting Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
One exception to the content neutral, viewpoint neutral requirement is that the
government may make content based decisions when it spends its own money to
express it own message. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 833 (1995) (stating that the Court has "permitted the government to regulate
the content of what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker or when it enlists
private entities to convey its own message"). There are two cases that might be read
to permit the government to make content based decisions even when it subsidizes
private speech. In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998),
the pertinent statute required the NEA to judge grant applications based on
"'artistic excellence and artistic merit .... taking into consideration general
standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American
public.'" Id. at 576 n.* (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (2000)). Justice O'Connor,
writing for the majority, held that this standard did not necessarily discriminate
based on viewpoint. Id. at 580-87. She also seemed to suggest, however, that content
based judgments were permissible. Id. at 585 (noting that "[a]ny content-based
considerations that may be taken into account in the grant-making process are a
consequence of the nature of arts funding"). Nonetheless, surely the government
cannot engage in content discrimination in the sense of denying funding "based on
hostility.., towards the underlying message expressed." R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992). Justice O'Connor seemed to recognize this point when she
noted that "even in the provision of subsidies, the Government may not 'ai[m] at the
suppression of dangerous ideas.'" Finley, 524 U.S. at 587 (quoting Regan v. Taxation
with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983)). On the actual facts of the
case, the subsidy was not based on hostility to content even though it had an
incidental effect on content. Instead, the subsidy was based on the articulated
content neutral, viewpoint neutral, reasonably objective standard of "artistic
excellence." Id. at 576. In other words, the subsidy discriminated based on the
constitutionally permissible reason of poor artistic merit, not on the constitutionally
impermissible reason of disagreement with the underlying message.
In United States v. American Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003), the federal
government provided financial assistance to public libraries to provide internet
access on the condition that they install software to block images unprotected by the
First Amendment, including obscenity, child pornography, and material that is
harmful to minors. See id. at 199 (plurality opinion). Such blocking software,
however, is not perfect; it may block speech that is constitutionally protected. See id.
at 201. Consequently, one of the issues was whether installation of the software
violated the First Amendment. Id. at 203. In answering this question, a plurality of
the Court asserted "that the government has broad discretion to make content-based
judgments in deciding what private speech to make available to the public." Id. at
204. Any content discrimination in the case, however, was clearly de minimis since,
upon request, a library was free to unblock any inadvertently blocked First
Amendment protected images. Id. at 209; id. at 214 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at
219 (Breyer, J., concurring).
A subsidy case in contrast to Finley and American Library Ass'n is Legal
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articulable reason for the exclusion other than "hostility-or
favoritism-towards the underlying message expressed,"20 4 or the
underlying facts must "refute[] an inference of [such]
discrimination., 205
Neither of the foregoing existed in Rosenberger. The
university argued that the Establishment Clause mandated the
exclusion, 20 6 and that in any event, the Constitution permits
government to discriminate based on content when it spends its
own money to subsidize even private speech.20 7 The majority
rejected both contentions. 208 Consequently, all that was left was
the bare desire to discriminate without any constitutionally
justifiable reason. This surely indicates that the exclusion
amounted to no more than disagreement with, if not outright
hostility toward, the religious content of the speech. Therefore,
the university did not simply exclude a subject matter; instead, it
went further and engaged in content discrimination.
The restriction on such content based exclusions follows in
part from the prohibition on viewpoint based exclusions. As the
majority recognized in Rosenberger, viewpoint discrimination is
"a subset" of and "an egregious form of content discrimination." 20 9
Thus, prohibited viewpoint discrimination in both nonpublic and
limited public forums is, by definition, also prohibited content
discrimination.
Viewpoint discrimination is not, however, a necessary
element of content discrimination. For example, in Widmar v.
Vincent, the university's exclusion of a registered student group
from a limited forum was based on the religious content of its
speech, rather than on any viewpoint the group had on any
Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001). In that case, the federal
government provided funds to the Legal Service Corporation to provide legal
services in civil cases to persons who could not afford them. Id. at 536. A condition of
the grant prohibited representation that "involve[d] an effort to amend or otherwise
challenge existing welfare law." Id. at 536-37. Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, held that when "private speech is involved,... Congress' antecedent
funding decision cannot be aimed at the suppression of ideas thought inimical to the
Government's own interest." Id. at 548-49.
204 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 386.
205 Gilles v. Blanchard, 477 F.3d 466, 473 (7th Cir. 2007).
206 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 837.
207 Id. at 832-33.
208 Id. at 832-46.
209 Id. at 829, 831.
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particular subject. 210 Similarly, in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.
v. Conrad, a municipal theater board's denial of a promoter's
application to use what was apparently a limited public forum
211
for a production of the show Hair, was based on the alleged
obscene content of the production, not on its anti-draft, anti-war,
or other viewpoint. 2
12
Content discrimination, whether alone or in the form of
viewpoint discrimination, is subject to strict scrutiny because it
"pose[s] the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to
advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular
ideas or information or manipulate the public debate through
coercion rather than persuasion."213  Such "restrictions 'rais[e]
the specter that the Government may effectively drive certain
ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.' "214 "Government
action that stifles speech on account of its message, or that
requires the utterance of a particular message favored by the
Government, contravenes th[e] essential right" that is "[a]t the
heart of the First Amendment;" namely, "that each person should
decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of
expression, consideration, and adherence."215
These same principles apply when the government creates a
limited public forum or a nonpublic forum. The government may
restrict such forums to certain speakers or topics, but any
such restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny if they
210 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981) (referring to the exclusion
as content based).
211 420 U.S. 546, 548 (1975). The Court found that the auditorium was a
designated forum but did not express any view as to the type of public forum. Id. at
555. The auditorium's "dedication booklet" stated that the purpose of the auditorium
was "to make [it] the community center of [the city]; where civic, educational [sic]
religious, patriotic and charitable organizations and associations may have a
common meeting place to discuss and further the upbuilding and general welfare of
the city and surrounding territory." Id. at 549 n.4. This language seems to suggest
that the forum was a limited one in that it was generally available but only for those
named topics and speakers. As a practical matter, however, the permitted uses were
so broad that it could be argued that the forum was a designated public forum
generally available for all speakers and subjects. Cf. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 391 (1993) (noting there was "considerable
force" to the argument that similar broad language created a forum similar to a
traditional public forum).
212 Conrad, 420 U.S. at 548.
213 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
214 Id. (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)).
215 Id.
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discriminate because of content of the message. The reason is
that such discrimination also "pose[s] the inherent risk that
the Government seeks.. . to suppress unpopular ideas or
information" contrary to the underlying purpose of the First
Amendment. 216
This is analogous to the rule articulated in R.A. V. v. City of
St. Paul.217  In that case, the Court held that government
regulations even of speech, such as fighting words, that is
otherwise outside the scope of the First Amendment, is subject to
"a 'content discrimination' limitation."218  In other words, even
though the government may proscribe such speech, it may not do
so "based on hostility-or favoritism-towards the underlying
message expressed. '219 Similarly, even though the government
may restrict limited public forums and nonpublic forums to
certain speakers and subjects, it may not do so because of the
content of the speaker's underlying message.220
2. The Reasonableness Requirement
Exclusions from both nonpublic and limited public forums
are not only required to be content and viewpoint neutral, but
they are also required to be reasonable. In nonpublic forum
216 Id.
217 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
218 Id. at 387.
219 Id. at 386.
220 The failure to carefully distinguish between constitutionally permissible
subject matter exclusions from limited and nonpublic forums and impermissible
content based exclusions is also evident in the lower courts as well as in the
literature. For example, in Faith Center Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover,
462 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 2006), rev'd in part, vacated in part, 480 F.3d 891 (9th Cir.
2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3022 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2007), a panel in the Ninth
Circuit, relying in part on Rosenberger, held that the exclusion of religious services
from a limited public forum was constitutionally permissible because it was a
viewpoint neutral and reasonable exclusion of subject matter, even though it
conceded that the exclusion was content based. Id. at 1207-14; see also C. Thomas
Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems in First Amendment Analysis,
55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 109, 118 (1986) (seemingly equating subject matter
exclusions with "content bias"); Post, supra note 8, at 1750 (describing speaker and
subject matter exclusions from a nonpublic forum as "discriminat[ion] on the basis of
content"). But cf. Buchanan, supra note 114, at 954, 962, 977 (opining that the Court
applied a reasonableness standard of review to "content-selective" subject matter
exclusions and that such exclusions from a nonpublic forum should be subject to "an
intermediate 'careful scrutiny' level of review"); Cass, supra note 1, at 1324 (noting
that courts should distinguish between "subject-matter restraints" and "message-
specific restraints").
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cases, the Court has sometimes verbalized the reasonableness
requirement slightly differently. It has said that exclusions must
be "reasonable;" 221 reasonable "in light of the purpose served by
the forum;" 222 reasonable "in light of the purpose of the forum
and all the surrounding circumstances;" 223 and "reasonable in
light of the purpose of the property."224 It also has said that " 'the
governmental interest must be assessed in light of the
characteristic nature and function of the particular forum
involved.' "225 While reasonableness in light of the purpose of the
forum versus reasonableness in light of the purpose of the
property could be viewed as distinct analytical constructs,226 it is
doubtful whether any of these formulations make any functional
difference. Presumably, the rule is that the reasonableness is
assessed in light of all the surrounding circumstances, including
the nature, function, and purpose of both the forum and the
property that encompasses the forum.
In limited forum cases, the Court has simply relied on the
nonpublic forum cases for the proposition that exclusions from
limited public forums must be "'reasonable in light of the
purpose served by the forum.'"227 This reliance on nonpublic
forum cases suggests that the basic rule for assessing the
reasonableness of exclusions from both types of forums is
essentially the same.
In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund,
Inc.,228 however, Justice O'Connor, treating limited public forums
as a type of "public forum," suggested in dictum that the
application of the reasonableness standard might be different in
nonpublic and limited public forum cases. She asserted that "the
221 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
222 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).
223 Id. at 809.
224 Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 682 (1998).
225 United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 732 (1990) (quoting Heffron v. Int'l
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 650-51 (1981)).
226 The latter might refer to the nature of the property that encompasses the
forum, such as an airport or military base, while the former might refer to the
nature of the forum itself, such as a candidate debate.
227 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 107 (2001) (quoting
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806, and citing Perry, 460 U.S.
at 46, 49); cf. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
392-93 (1993) (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806, but not explicitly finding a
limited public forum).
228 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
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avoidance of controversy" might be reasonable in a nonpublic
forum, but not in a limited public forum,229 and that "[i]n contrast
to a public forum, a finding of strict incompatibility between the
nature of the speech or the identity of the speaker and the
functioning of the nonpublic forum is not mandated." 230 This
dictum does not necessarily undermine the assertion that the
basic rule for assessing reasonableness in nonpublic and limited
public forums cases is essentially the same. Instead, it is best
read as confirming the not so startling proposition that the
application of the standard to different facts can yield different
results.
The reasonableness requirement mandates that restrictions
"be reasonable; [they] need not be the most reasonable or the only
reasonable limitation[s]." 231  Some commentators have viewed
this standard as being "highly deferential." 232 In fact, one has
asserted that it is "essentially no review at all."23 3  These
commentators base their conclusions in part on the fact that at
time of their articles, the Court had not yet struck down any
exclusion from a nonpublic forum. 234
Nonetheless, this standard does have some bite. For one
thing, the Court has not simply deferred to the government's
exclusions; instead, it has attempted to reach a reasoned result.
This point is illustrated by the way the Court applied the
reasonableness standard in Cornelius, Perry,235 and Forbes.236 As
previously discussed, the Court in those cases engaged in a
reasoned analysis of the underlying facts in order to determine
whether the government's rationales were in fact reasonable. 237
The same type of reasoned analysis is evident in other
nonpublic forum cases. For example, in Greer v. Spock, political
candidates were excluded from campaigning on a military base 238
even though certain other "[c]ivilian speakers [had] occasionally
229 Id. at 811.
230 Id. at 808.
231 Id.
232 Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 28, at 90; see also Dienes,
supra note 220, at 117 (similar).
233 Dienes, supra note 220, at 117.
234 See id.; Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 28, at 90.
235 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
236 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
237 See supra text accompanying notes 131-33, 141-47, 148-51, 161-62, 173-75.
238 424 U.S. 828, 832-33 (1976).
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been invited to the base to address military personnel."239 The
Court found that the base was not a public forum 240 and that the
candidates could be constitutionally excluded. 24' In upholding
the exclusion, however, Justice Stewart, writing for the majority,
did not simply defer to the government; instead, he reached a
reasoned result based on the underlying facts. He found that
the policy "of keeping official military activities ... free of
entanglement with partisan political campaigns of any kind" was
"wholly consistent with the American constitutional tradition
of a politically neutral military establishment under civilian
control."242 He also observed that "[u]nder such a policy members
of the Armed Forces ... are wholly free as individuals to attend
political rallies, out of uniform and off base. But the military as
such is insulated from both the reality and the appearance
of acting as a handmaiden for partisan political causes or
candidates."243
Similarly, in another nonpublic forum case, Lehman v. City
of Shaker Heights, political advertisements were excluded on a
city-owned transit system even though advertisements for goods
and services were permitted. 244 A majority of the Court upheld
the exclusion. Justice Blackmun's plurality opinion,245 however,
did not blindly defer to the government. Instead, he made a
reasoned judgment that the exclusion was reasonable because
"[r]evenue earned from long-term commercial advertising could
be jeopardardized by ... short-term candidacy or issue-
oriented advertisements," and the "blare of political propaganda"
created the "risk of imposing upon a captive audience." 246  In
addition, "[t]here could be lurking doubts about favoritism, and
239 Id. at 831.
240 See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text; see also Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 809 (1985) (citing Greer as a nonpublic
forum case).
241 Greer, 424 U.S. at 838.
242 Id. at 839.
243 Id.
244 418 U.S. 298, 300 (1974); see Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806, 808-09 (citing
Lehman as a nonpublic forum case).
245 Three Justices joined Justice Blackmun's opinion. Lehman, 481 U.S. at 299.
Justice Douglas concurred principally on the ground that the advisement would
impose on a captive audience. Id. at 307 (Douglas, J., concurring).
246 Id. at 304 (plurality opinion).
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sticky administrative problems ... in parceling out limited space
to eager politicians. 247
Further support for the proposition that "reasonableness"
has some teeth is indicated by the fact that in International
Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 248 a majority of the
Court did in fact strike down an exclusion from a nonpublic
forum. In that case five members of the Court, including Justice
O'Connor in a concurring opinion, held that an airport terminal
was nonpublic forum. 249 She joined the other four Justices,
however, to make a majority striking down a rule that excluded
"peaceful pamphleteering" from the terminal. 250 Based on an
analysis of the underlying facts, Justice O'Connor concluded that
it was unreasonable to totally exclude such speech from
the nonpublic forum.251 She noted that the terminal was a
"multipurpose environment" that included "restaurants,
cafeterias, snack bars, coffee shops, cocktail lounges, post offices,
banks, telegraph offices, clothing shops, drug stores, food stores,
nurseries, barber shops, currency exchanges, art exhibits,
commercial advertising displays, bookstores, newsstands, dental
offices, and private clubs." 252 Consequently, she could not "accept
that a total ban ... [was] reasonable without an explanation as
to why such a restriction 'preserv[ed] the property' for the several
uses to which it has been put."253
In addition, there is also a limited forum case, Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,254 that
supports the position that the reasonableness standard requires
a reasoned analysis and is not "toothless."255 In that case, the
Court of Appeals had held that the property at issue was a
247 Id.
248 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
249 Id. at 678-83; id. at 686 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
250 Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Kennedy,
joined by Justices Souter, Stevens, and Blackmun, argued that the airport terminal
was a public forum and that the exclusion was not a reasonable time, place, and
manner restriction. Id. at 693 (Kennedy, J., concurring). However, a 6-3 majority of
the Court upheld the exclusion for soliciting money. Id. at 685 (majority opinion); id.
at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 703 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
251 Id. at 690-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
252 Id. at 692, 688.
253 Id. at 692.
254 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
255 Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976) (using the term in the context of
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
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limited public forum and that an exclusion was "viewpoint
neutral and reasonable."256  On review, however, the Court
chided the lower court for "utter[ing] not a word in support of its
reasonableness holding."25 7
It is certainly possible to argue that the reasonableness
standard is not rigorous enough, and that all restrictions on
speech should be subject to strict scrutiny.258  It is an
overstatement, however, to suggest that the application of the
standard is no review at all.
C. The Application of the Standard in Limited Public Forums
Cases
Exclusions from a limited public forum can occur in two
ways. First, the government can define the parameters of the
forum in a way that excludes certain speakers or subjects. In
such a case, the property is a nonpublic forum as to the person or
topics excluded. For example, recall that in Perry Education
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, Justice White noted that
even if the school district had created a limited public forum for
certain "organizations that engage in activities of interest and
educational relevance to students" by permitting them to use the
internal mail system, the property would still be a nonpublic
forum with respect to an organization, such as the excluded rival
union, that was "concerned with the terms and conditions of
employment. ' 259 Second, the government may attempt to exclude
a speaker or subject that otherwise falls within the boundaries of
the forum created. As Justice White also suggested in Perry,
such exclusion might exist if the school district permitted
community organizations such as the "Cub Scouts, YMCA's, and
parochial schools" to use the mail system but excluded similar
organizations such as "the Girl Scouts" and "the local boys'
club. ' 260 As we have seen, there is dicta in some nonpublic forum
cases to the effect that this second type of exclusion, but not the
first, is subject to strict scrutiny. 261 Nonetheless, in practice, the
256 Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 390.
257 Id. at 393.
258 Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34
STAN. L. REV. 113, 142 (1981) (arguing that all restrictions on speech should be
subject to strict scrutiny).
259 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 48 (1983).
260 Id.
261 See supra notes 127-75 and accompanying text.
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Court has not applied strict scrutiny as the standard of review in
such cases. Indeed, in one case where the claimant was excluded
from a limited public forum, even though it otherwise fell within
its scope, a majority of the Court essentially said that strict
scrutiny does not apply to exclusions from limited public forums;
it only applies to exclusions from open access forums that are
generally available for all speakers and topics. 26
2
In fact, the Court effectively has "collapsed the distinction
between exclusions that ... define the contours of the [limited
public] forum and those that are imposed after the [limited
public] forum is created."263  In both cases, it basically has
applied the same reasonableness standard of review that is
applicable to exclusions from nonpublic forums. 264 As previously
noted, under that standard, content neutral and viewpoint
neutral exclusions must be reasonable, and only content or
viewpoint discriminatory exclusions are subject to strict
scrutiny.265 In other words, the Court has not applied strict
scrutiny in limited public forum cases on the theory that the
government had excluded persons or topics otherwise within its
the scope; rather, it has applied strict scrutiny only after making
a preliminary determination that the exclusions were either
content or viewpoint discriminatory.
For example, in Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission, a school board created a
limited public forum when it opened its meetings to the public for
school board business. 266 Pursuant to an order of the state's
Employment Relations Commission, however, it prohibited
teachers from speaking on matters otherwise within the scope of
the forum.267  The Court held that the exclusion was
impermissible, but not because the teachers fell within the
262 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001) ("[In] a
traditional or open public forum the State's restrictions on speech are subject to
stricter scrutiny than are restrictions in a limited public forum.").
263 United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 750 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
264 See supra notes 127-75 and accompanying text (discussing the nonpublic
forum cases); infra notes 266-85 and accompanying text (discussing the limited
public forum cases).
265 See supra notes 13113-18 and accompanying text.
266 Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S.
167, 174 & n.6 (1976); see Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 46 n.7 (1983) (describing Madison as a limited public forum "for the
discussion of certain subjects").
267 Madison, 429 U.S. at 173.
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boundaries of the limited public forum. Instead, it held that the
exclusion was impermissible because it was content based
without any constitutionally justifiable reason.268
Similarly, in Widmar v. Vincent, the university denied access
to a limited public forum 269 to a student group that otherwise fell
within the scope of the forum,270 because the students wanted "to
use the facilities for religious worship. '271 The Court applied
strict scrutiny as the standard of review, but not on the ground
that speakers fell within the parameters of the limited public
forum. Instead, it applied strict scrutiny because the exclusion
was content based.272 Only after determining that the exclusion
was content discriminatory did the Court require the university
to justify the exclusion with a compelling interest.273
Also, in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of
Virginia, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, found that
the university had excluded religious subject matter that was
otherwise "within" the permissible boundaries of a limited public
forum,274 but he did not apply strict scrutiny as the standard of
review because of that fact. Instead, he principally relied on
nonpublic forum cases for the proposition that exclusions
from limited public forums must be viewpoint neutral and
reasonable. 275  Only after he found that the restriction was
viewpoint discriminatory did he address the issue of whether
there was some compelling or other constitutionally justifiable
reason for the exclusion. 276
268 See id. at 176 ("Whatever its duties as an employer, when the board sits in
public meetings to conduct public business and hear the views of citizens, it may
not . . . discriminate between speakers on the basis of their employment, or the
content of their speech.").
269 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 272 (1981) (referring to the property as a
limited public forum).
270 Id. at 264-65.
271 Id. at 265.
272 Id. at 269-70.
273 Id. at 269-70. The university argued that the exclusion was justified because
it had "a compelling interest in maintaining strict separation of church and state"
under the "'Establishment Clauses' of both the Federal and [State] Constitutions."
Id. at 270. The Court, however, held that the Federal Establishment Clause did not
prevent the inclusion of religious speakers in the forum, id. at 273-75, and that it
was "unable to recognize the State's interest as sufficiently 'compelling,'" id. at 278.
274 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995).
275 Id. at 829-30 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 804-06 (1985) and Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 46, 49 (1983)).
276 See id. at 832-46.
20081
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Similarly, in Good News Club v. Milford Central School277
and Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District,278 religious speakers were excluded from public school
facilities that were otherwise generally available to members of
the public279 for "'instruction in any branch of education,
learning or the arts'" and for "'social, civic and recreational
meetings and entertainment events and other uses pertaining to
the welfare of the community.' "280 Although the Court in both
cases found that the subject matters at issue were within the
permissible boundaries of the respective limited public forums,
281
it did not apply strict scrutiny as the standard of review in either
case. In fact in Good News Club, Justice Thomas, writing for the
majority, specifically stated that in "a traditional or open public
forum, the State's restrictions on speech are subject to stricter
scrutiny than are restrictions in a limited public forum ."22
Instead, relying mostly on nonpublic forum cases, the Court in
both cases applied the same reasonableness standard of review
that is applicable to exclusions from nonpublic forums, that such
exclusions must be viewpoint neutral and reasonable. 28 3 In both
277 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
278 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
279 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 102-04; Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 386-
87.
280 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 102 (quoting N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414 (McKinney
2000)); see Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 386 (similar).
281 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 109 ("[Tlhe club seeks to address a subject
otherwise permitted .... the teaching of morals and character, from a religious
standpoint."); Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393-94 (finding "that a lecture or film
about child rearing and family values" was "no doubt a subject otherwise
permissible" in the forum). In Good News Club, the Court assumed that the forum
was a limited public forum. 533 U.S. at 106. Although the Court in Lamb's Chapel
did not explicitly classify the forum, the Court of Appeals had held that it was a
limited public forum. 508 U.S. at 390.
282 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983)).
283 See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 392-93 ('Vith respect to public property that
is not a designated public forum open for indiscriminate public use .... we have said
that '[c]ontrol over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and
speaker identity so a long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the
purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.'" (quoting Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985))); see also Good
News Club, 533 U.S at 106-07 (citing Perry, Cornelius, and Rosenberger for the
principle that where "the forum is a traditional or open public forum, the state's
restrictions on speech are subject to stricter scrutiny than are restrictions in a
limited public forum" and that the restrictions in the latter are required to be
reasonable and viewpoint neutral).
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cases, the Court held that the exclusions were viewpoint
discriminatory2 4 and that the Establishment Clause did
not provide a constitutionally justifiable reason for the
discrimination. 28 5
VII. THERE IS No NEED TO HAVE A LIMITED PUBLIC FORUM
The underlying assumption of the public forum doctrine is
that the categorization of government property as a particular
type of forum is necessary in order to determine the standard of
review for exclusions of speakers and subjects. 28 6 Consequently,
the only justification for distinguishing between limited public
forums and nonpublic forums is that exclusions from each are
subject to a different standard of review. As we have seen,
however, there is conflicting authority on this point. In dicta in
cases involving exclusions from nonpublic forums, the Court has
equated limited public forums with designated open access public
forums and asserted that strict scrutiny is the appropriate
standard of review. 28 7 Nonetheless, in cases actually involving
exclusions from limited public forums, the Court has effectively
equated limited public forums with nonpublic forums and has
applied the same standard of review for exclusions from the
former that it applies for exclusions from the latter.288 That
standard is that content and viewpoint neutral exclusions must
be reasonable under all the facts and circumstances; content or
viewpoint discriminatory exclusions are subject to strict scrutiny.
If the standard of review that applies for exclusions from both
types of restricted forums is the same, there would seem to be no
reason to distinguish between them.
Of course, the fact that the Court has applied the same
standard of review in both types of restricted forum cases does
not necessarily mean that it must always do so. It did not need
to apply a different standard of review in the limited public
284 Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393-94; Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 107.
285 Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395; Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 112-19.
286 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797
(1985) ("[W]e must identify the nature of the forum, because the extent to which the
Government may limit access depends on whether the forum is public or
nonpublic."); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46
(1983) (discussing the different standards of review that apply depending on the
categorization of the forum).
287 See supra notes 127-75 and accompanying text.
288 See supra notes 259-85 and accompanying text.
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forum cases because it was able to strike down those exclusions
on the ground that they were either content or viewpoint
discriminatory. It still might decide to apply a differential
standard in subsequent cases. For example, it could decide to
apply strict scrutiny as the standard of review in cases involving
exclusions of speakers and subjects that otherwise'fall within the
scope of a limited public forum. If the Court did decide to apply
strict scrutiny in such cases, it could dismiss as dicta contrary
language in some limited forum cases to the effect that strict
scrutiny does not apply to exclusions from limited public
forums. 28 9 There are four reasons why it might choose to do so.
First, there is logic to the dicta in the nonpublic forum cases
that limited public forums are a type of designated public forum
and therefore should be subject to a stricter standard of review.
While the government is not required to create a designated
public forum that is generally available for all speakers and
topics, if it does, the First Amendment requires that exclusions
be subject to strict scrutiny.290 Similarly, while the government
may restrict a limited public forum to certain classes of speakers
and subjects, it "must respect the lawful boundaries it has itself
set.'' 291 Consequently, having intentionally decided to make its
property generally available for those limited purposes, the
government cannot turn around and exclude those who otherwise
fall within its scope without some compelling reason.
Second, applying strict scrutiny to exclusions from limited
public forums would shorten the analysis. Recall that in all the
limited public forum cases, the Court took the preliminary step of
finding that the exclusions were either content or viewpoint
discriminatory before inquiring as to whether there was some
permissible reason for the discrimination. 292 The application of
strict scrutiny would obviate the need for any inquiry into
content and viewpoint neutrality and reasonableness. Once the
Court determined that the claimant otherwise fell within the
scope of a limited public forum, it could directly confront
the issue of whether there was some compelling or other
constitutionally justifiable reason for the exclusion.
289 See supra notes 274-85 and accompanying text.
290 See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
291 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
292 See supra notes 266-85 and accompanying text.
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Third, applying strict scrutiny to exclusions from limited
public forums might, at least superficially, be seen as more
speech protective than a content neutral, viewpoint neutral,
reasonableness requirement. 293  The former is obviously a
"stricter" standard than the latter.294
Finally, applying strict scrutiny to exclusions from limited
public forums would provide a rationale for distinguishing
between limited public forums and nonpublic forums. As already
noted, there is really no reason to distinguish between them if
the standard of review for exclusions from both is the same.
Conversely, the principal disadvantage to applying strict
scrutiny to exclusions from limited public forums is that it
requires the Court to make a threshold determination as to
whether the forum at issue is a limited public forum or whether
it is in fact a nonpublic forum that is subject to a different
standard of review. This process has caused considerable
confusion and uncertainty, and has consumed much judicial
effort.295 Moreover, the inquiry seems largely unnecessary. As
we have seen, all of the restricted forum cases have been decided
based on the application of the same standard of review,
regardless of how the forum was characterized. 296 Furthermore,
there seems to be only one improbable case that in theory might
arguably justify distinguishing between nonpublic and limited
public forums for purposes of applying a differential standard of
review.
That case is a content neutral, viewpoint neutral, reasonable
exclusion of a speaker or topic that would otherwise fall within
the scope of what, under current law, could be characterized as a
limited public forum. Such exclusion would theoretically be
permissible under the standard of review that the Court has so
far applied in such cases. But if strict scrutiny applied,
293 Cf. David Goldberger, Judicial Scrutiny in Public Forum Cases: Misplaced
Trust in the Judgment of Public Officials, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 175, 214 (1983) (arguing
in the context of content neutral time, place, and manner restrictions that "minimal
scrutiny is responsible for insulating systematic overprotection of regulatory
interests, and underprotection of speech"); Redish, supra note 258, at 142 ("[Tlhe
courts should subject all restrictions on expression to the same critical scrutiny
traditionally reserved for regulations drawn in terms of content.").
294 See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678-79
(1992) (noting that strict scrutiny is the "highest scrutiny" and that reasonableness
and viewpoint neutrality is "a much more limited review").
295 See supra notes 7-11, 127-75 and accompanying text.
296 See supra notes 123-85 and accompanying text.
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content and viewpoint neutrality and reasonableness would be
irrelevant, and the issue would be whether there was some
compelling reason for the exclusion.
The fact that no such case has ever reached the Supreme
Court, however, may be a good indication that no such case
exists. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how an exclusion of a
speaker or topic, that would otherwise fall within the boundaries
of what is currently categorized as a limited public forum, could
be content neutral, viewpoint neutral, or reasonable. Some
examples from, the cases illustrate this point.
Suppose that in the teacher mail box case, Perry Education
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,297 the rival union had been
excluded despite a district policy that permitted all rival teacher
unions, including both those who represented the teachers and
those who did not, to use the mail facilities. All other things
being equal, the exclusion presumably would violate the First
Amendment, but not because of any necessity to distinguish
between nonpublic forums and limited public forums for the
purpose of applying strict scrutiny. Instead, the exclusion would
likely be struck down because of a lack of any articulable
reasonable, content neutral, viewpoint neutral, constitutionally
justifiable basis to support it.298 Certainly, on these facts the
exclusion could not be justified on the reasons given in the actual
case: differential status and "'prevent[ing] the District's schools
from becoming a battlefield for inter-union squabbles.' "299 The
fact that the school had created a policy permitting access by all
teacher unions effectively renders such defenses untenable.
To take another example from Perry that was previously
discussed, suppose that despite a policy of permitting community
groups that "engage in activities of interest and educational
relevance to students," such as "Cub Scouts, YMCAs, and
parochial schools," to use the mail facilities, the school district
297 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
298 Professor Post agrees that the result in Perry did not depend on the
characterization of the mailboxes as a limited or nonpublic forum, but his point is
that the rival union would have been excluded in either case. Post, supra note 8, at
1754. I agree with that assertion. My point, however, is that the outcome in
restricted forum cases depends on an analysis of the underlying facts, not on the
characterization of the forum.
299 Perry, 460 U.S. at 52 (quoting Haukvedahl v. Sch. Dist. No. 108, No. 75C-
3641 (N.D. Ill. 1976)).
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denied access to "the local boy's club." 30 0 Regardless of how the
forum is characterized, it is difficult to imagine what articulable
reasonable, content neutral, viewpoint neutral, constitutionally
justifiable reason could possibly validate the exclusion.
Similarly, suppose that in the charitable solicitation case,
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc.,30 1
the government had permitted all charitable organizations to
solicit funds in the federal workplace, instead of, as in the actual
case, "limit[ing] participation to 'voluntary charitable, health and
welfare agencies that ... [do not] seek to influence the outcomes
of elections or the determination of public policy through political
activity or advocacy, lobbying, or litigation on behalf of parties
other then themselves.' "302 In such a case, the exclusion of a
charitable organization that sought to influence policy through
litigation would, on its face, be unreasonable, if not irrational and
nonsensical. There also would be a strong inference that the
exclusion was content or viewpoint based. Certainly, having
expressly permitted such organizations to solicit, the government
could not justify the exclusion for the reasons articulated in the
actual case; namely, that the exclusion was necessary "to
minimize disruption to the federal workplace, to ensure the
success of the fund-raising effort, or to avoid the appearance of
political favoritism."30 3 Consequently, there would be no need to
characterize the forum as a limited public forum in order to apply
strict scrutiny.
Finally, suppose that in the candidates' debate case,
Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes,30 4 the
government had excluded the plaintiff candidate even though it
had advertised that the debate would have, contrary to what
Justice Kenney held in the actual case, "an open-microphone
format" in the sense that it was open to all candidates for the
congressional seat. On these facts, there clearly would be no
need to classify the forum as a limited public forum and apply
strict scrutiny. Having declared the forum open to all candidates
for the seat, it would be unreasonable to exclude the plaintiff.
Again, surely the government could not justify the exclusion for
300 See id. at 48.
301 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
302 Id. at 795 (citation omitted).
303 Id. at 813.
304 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
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the reasons given in the actual case; that the candidate "had
generated no appreciable public interest"30 5 and that including all
such candidates would be "logistical ly]" difficult. 30 6
As these examples demonstrate, not only has the Court not
applied a different standard of review in limited public forum
and nonpublic forum cases, but also it is doubtful that there
would ever be any necessity to do so. The fact is that all of the
restricted forum cases have been, and can be, decided based on
the application of the same standard of review: Content neutral
and viewpoint neutral exclusions must be reasonable under all
the facts and circumstances, and content or viewpoint exclusions
are subject to strict scrutiny. What determines the outcome in
these cases is the application of this standard to varying facts,
not the categorization of the forum as limited public or nonpublic.
Consequently, there really is no need to have a limited public
forum.
VIII. WHAT THE COURT SHOULD Do Now
The Court should abandon the distinction between limited
public forums and nonpublic forums. Instead, it should analyze
speaker access issues in terms of open and restricted forums.
When the government excludes a First Amendment protected
speaker or subject from an open forum, the standard of review
should continue to be strict scrutiny. When the government
permits its property to be used for some speakers and subjects,
and the forum is not an open one either by tradition or
intentional government designation, the property should be
considered a restrictive forum. In such cases, the standard of
review should continue to be that content neutral and viewpoint
neutral exclusions must be reasonable; but content or viewpoint
exclusions are subject to strict scrutiny. There are some good
reasons for retaining the limited public forum and applying strict
scrutiny to exclusions from it. As a practical matter, however,
the concept of a limited public forum as a unique category of
forum is unnecessary. Treating both the limited public forum
and the nonpublic forum as restricted forums, and applying the
same standard of review to both, would not likely change any of
305 Id. at 682.
306 Id. at 681.
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the results, but it would make the analysis in such cases easier,
more direct, and less confusing.
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